Domestic support and the Doha development agenda:an exercise in political economy by Zobbe, Henrik & Jensen, Hans Grinsted
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Domestic support and the Doha development agenda
Zobbe, Henrik; Jensen, Hans Grinsted
Publication date:
2005
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Zobbe, H., & Jensen, H. G. (2005). Domestic support and the Doha development agenda: an exercise in political
economy. (pp. 1-24). Copenhagen: Fødevareøkonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet. FOI Working Paper,
No. 7, Vol.. 2005
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
Domestic Support and the Doha Development Agenda: 
An exercise in political economy1
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Abstract 
Following the July 2004 Framework, this paper suggest that regardless of low or 
high level of reductions, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, the European Union, and 
United States have problems with both Total AMS and the overall base level of Total 
Trade Distorting Domestic Support. When recent policy reforms and likely changes 
such as the Agenda 2000, the Midterm Review Reform, the proposed sugar reform in 
the European Union and the farm bills of 1996 and 2002 in the United States are 
taken into account, it becomes clear that both the European Union and the United 
States would be able to accommodate low or moderate reductions in both Total AMS 
and Total Trade Distorting Domestic Support. In respect of high reductions, further 
domestic reforms would be needed for both the European Union and the United 
States.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the important issues in the current round of the WTO (World Trade Organiza-
tion) trade negotiations under the Doha-Development Agenda (DDA) is agricultural 
domestic support of member countries. The end goal of the DDA is straightforward. 
The future agreement on domestic support reductions has to achieve: increased disci-
pline with regard to support instruments and serious reductions in real support levels. 
The problems for the DDA is rather a lack of political willingness in many OECD 
countries, hence the United States and the European Union, than sound economic ar-
guments. Throughout the history of the GATT (General Agreement of Tariffs and 
Trade), agriculture has been a major conflict issue. This has been especially obvious 
since the full inclusion of the sector in the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-93). 
For many countries like the United States and the European Union agricultural subsi-
dies is a very sensitive topic. These domestic policies are deeply rooted in a long se-
ries of historical events and conditional economic and political structures and institu-
tions (Zobbe and Paarlberg, 2003; Zobbe, 2001). Further domestic reforms are com-
plicated and are slowing the multilateral process under the Doha negotiations.  
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) established the disciplinary 
framework for domestic agricultural support in WTO member countries by categoriz-
ing support into three boxes: an Amber Box with trade-distorting support, a Blue Box 
with production-coupled support combined with production constraining programs, 
and a Green Box with decoupled support programs (see Hart and Beghin 2005 for de-
tails). The URAA introduced reduction commitments on the amount of domestic sup-
port allowed in the Amber Box, while assistance in the Blue and Green Boxes was 
exempt from reduction commitments.  
 
In the Amber Box, an Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) was defined as an 
indicator of the amount of trade-distorting support. A 20 percent reduction commit-
ment on the Total AMS was agreed by developed countries (and 13 percent by devel-
oping countries) in the URAA, from an initial historical base of domestic support.  In 
principle all production-coupled support should have been cut but because of the ex-
emption of the Blue Box, and a historical base period reflecting very high initial sup-
port levels, domestic support cuts following the URAA have been rather disappoint-
ing (OECD 2001).  
 
The objective of this paper is twofold. Firstly, to analyze prospects for reductions in 
AMS, de minimis and Blue Box domestic support commitments across developed 
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WTO member countries, and to compare those prospective commitments with recent 
policy reforms in the European Union and the United States. Secondly, to indicate 
problems with the current concept of AMS by presenting and analyzing possible po-
litical options with respect to the notification of domestic agricultural support. Section 
2 introduces the term AMS more formally and compares the concept of AMS with the 
OECD concept of PSE and presents current AMS values broken down by products 
and countries. Two scenarios of, respectively a possible and a significant AMS, de 
minimis and Blue Box reductions are then presented in section 3. Section 4 compares, 
first of all, the scenarios with post-2001 policy changes in the European Union and 
the United States, and secondly introduces different means by which the two coun-
tries can fulfill their future commitments, before conclusions are drawn in the final 
section 5. 
2. Domestic support: PSE versus AMS 
The OECD Secretariat measures various types of agricultural support. The rationale 
for its efforts is to provide an objective estimate that can be used in the monitoring 
and evaluation of agricultural policy and be comparable across countries (OECD 
2004). Its Producer Support Estimate (PSE) provides an estimate of the monetary 
equivalent of all transfers to producers from consumers and taxpayers. It differs in 
many ways from the Uruguay Round’s Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS), 
which was constructed as a means of disciplining trade-distorting domestic support 
alongside disciplines on market access and export subsidies. The AMS is not a meas-
ure of the current support to agriculture, because some of its components are calcu-
lated using historical prices. AMS combines Disciplined (Amber Box) Consumer and 
Taxpayer Financed support (non-exempt support) given to agricultural products. 
These disciplined support policies include commodity-specific market price support 
based on administrative prices, direct government payments to producers, other com-
modity-specific transfers, and non-commodity specific measures of support received 
by producers. Domestic support exempted from AMS includes de minimis, support in 
the Blue and Green Box and Development Programs. Figure 1 presents a structural 
overview of domestic support and the different exempt and non-exempt components 
of domestic support. 
 
With respect to market price support (MPS), two important points need to be made. 
Firstly, the PSE uses current, observed, domestic and external prices to measure the 
support element, whereas the AMS uses administrative prices and an external price 
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fixed by the URAA. This fixed price is an average for the period 1986-883. Secondly, 
in the AMS approach, MPS only exists if an administrative price is officially re-
ported. This means that MPS through border measures without a notified adminis-
tered price is not included in the AMS, but would remain in the PSE’s MPS compo-
nent (OECD 2001 pp. 116-11; Hart and Beghin 2005)4. 
 
The de minimis rule excludes domestic support in the calculation of the AMS, when 
product-specific support is less than 5 percent of the value of production for devel-
oped countries and 10 percent for developing countries. Non-product-specific support 
is exempt up to 5 percent of the total value of production for developed countries and 
10 percent for developing countries. This rule has been interpreted to allow industrial 
countries up to ten percent of the value of their output as de minimis – 5 percent prod-
uct-specific and 5 percent non-product-specific. 
 
More than 30 countries made commitments under the URAA to reduce distorting do-
mestic support and to keep Amber Box support under ceiling commitments in their 
schedules. Developed countries agreed to a 20 percent reduction in AMS to be 
achieved in six installments from 1995, while developing countries agreed to a 13 
percent reduction over a 10-year period and least developed countries agreed not to 
increase support beyond the base period level. The base period for Total AMS reduc-
tions is 1986-88. After the implementation of the URAA and its reduction commit-
ments for Total AMS, member countries were left with a binding constraint on the 
level of permitted domestic support in the Amber Box.   
 
Countries with reduction commitments are responsible for reporting changes in the 
total level of support and in the composition of support to the WTO. This process of 
monitoring is important. Members can see if countries are fulfilling their commit-
ments distributed on boxes and de minimis. However, reporting lags are uneven 
across countries. Table 1 presents a snapshot of notified Total AMS in 1999 (the 
most-recent year with a full dataset) by developed countries for 18 aggregated prod-
ucts and for non-product-specific support. The European Union, the United States and 
                                                 
3 The use of the period 1986-88 as reference is one of the biggest problems in the URAA. This ref-
erence period is not alone used in the area of domestic support but also in other major areas of the 
agreement. The problem is that this period constitute a time of significant high protection, hence 
high price support, high tariffs and high export subsidies. 
4 Japan has used this method (loophole) to reduce its AMS reported to the WTO. Japan simply abol-
ished its administrative price for rice, which reduced its notified MPS in the AMS, but at the same 
time maintained its level of support for rice through border protection measures wherefore the MPS 
component of the PSE did not change. 
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Japan account for more than 90 percent of the US$81 billion notified AMS in 1999. 
The European Union alone accounts for more than 60 percent ($50 billion). This 
snapshot also gives some information about politically sensitive products, which in-
clude milk, beef, sugar, fruit and vegetables, and grains. Table 2 presents notified data 
for domestic support under the de minimis rule for 1999, by countries and products. 
The United States accounts for more than 80 percent ($7 billion) of total de minimis, 
and just about all of it is non-product-specific. Only a few other countries have some 
de minimis payments5. 
 
AMS notifications for the European Union and the United States are available for 
2001. These are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Total AMS in the European Union 
equals €44 billion, and the most-supported products are Beef, Vegetables and Fruits, 
Milk, Sugar, and Grains. MPS is the most dominating support element. As regards the 
United States, the Total AMS was $14 billion, and the most-supported products are 
milk, oilseeds, and non-product-specific support. But, because of the de minimis rule, 
the $6.8 billion in non-product-specific support is not included in Total AMS. Disci-
plined Taxpayer Financed direct payments are the most dominating support element. 
Let us now consider possible reduction scenarios under the current negotiations. 
3. Possible Doha-Round reductions 
The focus of the Doha Work Program (WTO, 2004) with regard to domestic support 
introduces a framework to reduce the possible use of Amber Box (AMS) and Blue 
Box payments and payments under the de minimis rule. Overall, the framework calls 
for “substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support” and specifies that 
special and differential treatment will be an integrated part of domestic support, and 
that there will be a strong element of harmonization in the reductions made by devel-
oped countries. 
 
To secure substantial reductions both the de minimis level and the allowed amount of 
Blue Box support will be capped. More specifically, the overall base level of all trade-
distorting domestic support, as measured by the Final Bound Total AMS plus the 
permitted de minimis level plus the highest level of Blue Box payments during a re-
cent reprehensive period, will be reduced according to a tiered formula; in the first 
year of implementation countries have to reduce support by 20 percent relative to this 
                                                 
5 For a complete overview of notified support from all countries with WTO commitments see Jensen 
and Zobbe (2005) Table 9.1 and Table 9.2. 
 
Domestic Support and the Doha Development Agenda, FOI 5
overall base; reductions in de minimis are also to be negotiated; Blue Box support in 
the future will not exceed 5 percent of a WTO member’s average total value of pro-
duction during an historical period to be agreed upon; and direct payments that do not 
require production under certain conditions can be placed in the Blue Box. 
 
Following these guidelines, Table 5 is constructed to analyze the outcome of a possi-
ble future agreement. For all countries the overall base value of all trade-distorting 
domestic support (column 4) is presented in the first row (Base Commitments) for 
each country listed. This level is calculated by adding Total AMS base levels from the 
URAA final bound AMS levels (column 1) to the permitted de minimis payments in a 
given reference period (column 2) plus the highest of the existing Blue Box payments 
during the 1995-2002 period, or 5 percent of total value of agricultural production 
(column 3). Following the framework, the reduction commitments modeled use a 
tiered reduction formula reducing both the base AMS commitment and total trade-
distorting domestic support. For the sake of argument, two different sets of possible 
reduction commitments are considered: A relatively high reduction commitment and a 
more politically feasible, low reduction commitment. According to Agra Europe 
(2005) the European Union can easily end up being forced to reduce its levels of do-
mestic support by a higher percent than any other developed country (Agra Europe, 
2005 pp. 1-2). This reflects the fact that the European Union is the world’s largest 
provider of domestic agricultural support in absolute terms.  The reduction percent is 
shown in column 76. 
 
The second and third rows in Table 5 present the new commitments for each country. 
Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Japan and the European Union are placed in the first 
tier where Total AMS are reduced by 50 % (60) and the overall base level of trade-
distorting domestic support is reduced by 60 % (70) in the low reduction commitment 
(in the high reduction commitment). Canada and the United States are placed in the 
second tier where the Total AMS is reduced by 35 % (55) and the overall base level 
of trade-distorting domestic support is reduced by 45 % (65). Finally, Australia and 
New Zealand are placed in the third tier where the Total AMS is reduced by 25 % 
(45) and the overall base level of trade-distorting domestic support is reduced by 35 
% (55). The de minimis is reduced from 5 percent of the value of production to 2.5 
                                                 
6 Considering the different tiers and their reduction commitments the only thing that seems clear at 
this moment of the negotiation of the Doha-Development Agenda is that there will be used a tier 
approach. The reductions and number of tiers studied in this paper is just a humble try to indicate 
some possibilities. That is the reason for the introduction of the low and high scenario and the three 
tiers. In Jensen and Zobbe (2005) we use a fourth tier for developing countries. 
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percent of the value of production. This second and third row can be compared to the 
fourth row, which for each country presents the latest notification to the WTO.  Re-
gardless of low or high level of reductions, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, the Euro-
pean Union, and the United States have problems on both Total AMS and overall 
base level of trade-distorting domestic support. The notified support from Japan, Can-
ada, New Zealand and Australia fulfill both reduction scenarios on both Total AMS 
and the overall base level of trade-distorting domestic support. The problem here is 
that 2001 notifications do not tell the whole story. Let us now consider the OECD ag-
ricultural policy reform process and hence the European Union and the United States 
in more detail. 
4. Recent policy reforms and future political options 
Since the mid-1980s most OECD countries have made reforms to their agricultural 
policies. Many economists argue that the OECD Trade Mandate of 1982 and the 
launch of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1986 triggered this reform process. Oth-
ers argue that the reform process in the European Union and the United States has 
been driven mainly by domestic rather than international politics (Paarlberg 1996). 
During the negotiations under the Uruguay Round, the European Union implemented 
the MacSharry Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the United 
States implemented Farm Bill 1990. Both sets of legislation introduced more market-
oriented policies and helped the multilateral agreement on its way, and vice versa. 
Since the conclusion of the URAA in late 1993 and the official launch of the Doha 
Development Round, both the European Union and the United States have introduced 
further agricultural policy legislation.  
 
In the case of the European Union, the Agenda 2000 Reform was adopted in 2000 and 
the more fundamental Midterm Review Reform (MTR) will be implemented across 
Europe beginning in 2005 (Jensen and Frandsen 2003). The Agenda 2000 Reform 
makes further reductions in some of the administrative prices in key market organiza-
tions under the CAP. In contrast with the MacSharry Reform, these price cuts are only 
partly compensated through hectare and animal premiums. The price support element 
of the CAP is part of the Amber Box and hence the AMS. The compensatory premi-
ums are paid to farmers in combination with set-aside programs and are therefore al-
located to the Blue Box. The MTR Reform introduces decoupled payments. The idea 
is to change both the hectare and animal premiums into historically based payments. 
The European Union member countries can choose to keep a small amount of produc-
tion-coupled premiums, and the European Commission expects about 10 percent of 
 
Domestic Support and the Doha Development Agenda, FOI 7
payments to remain coupled to production. This policy change will probably mean 
that most of the support now in the Blue Box will be moved to the Green Box7. Nev-
ertheless, the European Union will still need the Blue Box for what is left of hectare 
and animal premiums and for future reform scenarios. The MTR Reform only intro-
duces minor changes in the market price support regimes. The European Union sugar 
regime has not been touched by reforms yet, but the European Commission has put 
forward a number of reforms. The administrative sugar price will be reduced by 39 
percent over a few years. Sugar beet growers will be partly compensated by decoup-
led payments.  
 
Table 6 sums up the reductions in administrative prices implemented under the 
Agenda 2000, and the MTR Reform, together with the proposed reductions in the 
sugar intervention price. If the latter price reductions are implemented, a new Total 
AMS can be calculated and compared with the estimated new commitments presented 
in Table 5. This is done in Table 7 for the European Union. The bottom line is that it 
brings the European Union’s Total AMS down from €44 to €29 billion.  In respect of 
the largest reduction in Total AMS by 60 percent and Total trade distorting domestic 
support by 70 percent, the already achieved reforms are not enough. The European 
Union falls short of €2 billion in AMS and a little less than €3 billion in Total trade 
distorting domestic support. Let us now consider the lowest reduction scenario. Here 
the AMS is reduced by 50 percent while the total trade distorting domestic support is 
reduced by 60 percent. In this reduction scenario the EU has no problem in keeping 
its domestic support notification within these limits. 
 
In the United States, a fundamental reform became reality under the 1996 Farm Bill, 
when the traditional approach to US agricultural policy was changed. Supply man-
agement in most areas was abolished, and the deficiency payment programs were 
converted to decoupled payments based on historical data. Also, the income safety net 
was lowered. Loan rates and hence loan deficiency payments were reduced, and a 
philosophy that farmers, in the future, should be guided more by the markets than by 
policies was adopted. The consequences for the commitments under the WTO were 
lower Amber Box support and a transfer of all Blue Box support to the Green Box. 
For political reasons, the United States then argued for the complete abolition of the 
                                                 
7 This may not be the case though. According to Agra Europe (2005), the WTO ruling against the 
United States Cotton subsidies could be used by analogy in the case of the Single Farm Payments 
(SFP). The problem lies in that both the United States cotton subsidies and SFP are supposed to be 
decoupled, but for farmers to receive them, they are not allowed to growth fruit and vegetables, or 
other permanent crops (Agra Europe, 2005). 
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Blue Box, but soon thereafter things changed for the worse: market prices fell, and 
bad weather across the country squeezed farm incomes. The political response was to 
provide ad hoc payments year after year so that the total AMS was back at former 
levels. The 2002 farm bill introduced a new policy instrument, which institutionalized 
the former ad hoc arrangements as counter-cyclical payments (CCP) that are non-
product-specific and partly decoupled. 
 
Table 8 incorporates legislation already implemented together with the new commit-
ments from Table 5. The most likely result of the current WTO negotiations will be to 
categorize the counter-cyclical payments as Blue Box support. The removal of the 
production control binding in WTO (2004) is a strong indicator of this assumption. 
This exercise means, in practice, that the ad hoc payments notified in 2001 as $4.6 
billion can be moved from the de minimis payments to the Blue Box. After these 
changes, the estimated new total AMS increases to $14.6 billion and the new esti-
mated Total Trade Distorting Domestic Support remains at $21.5 billion. In contrast, 
this helps the United States achieving the 50 percent reduction in support under the de 
minimis rule. In respect of the largest reduction in total AMS by 55 percent and total 
trade distorting domestic support by 65 percent, the already achieved policy changes 
are not enough. The United States falls short of $6 billion in AMS and $8 billion in 
total trade distorting domestic support. Let us now consider the lowest reduction sce-
nario. Here the AMS is reduced by 35 percent while the Total Trade Distorting Do-
mestic Support is reduced by 45 percent. This reduction scenario brings us very close 
to the support levels after taking recent policy changes under consideration. The esti-
mated level of Total AMS of $14.6 billion falls short of the estimated new commit-
ment on $12.4 billion by only $2.2 billion. In the case of Total trade distorting domes-
tic support, the end result is even closer. Here the estimated level of $21.5 billion falls 
short of the new estimated commitment on $21.1 billion by only $0.4 billion. 
 
Let us now discuss future agricultural policy options for the European Union and the 
United States in relations to bringing down their domestic support notifications and 
hence improve their WTO negotiation position. In addition to lowering the adminis-
tered invention prices, as mentioned above, the MTR reform of the CAP in the Euro-
pean Union also decouples the support from actual production by introducing a single 
farm payment to farmers. In the case of beef, the introduction of decoupled direct 
payments is expected to reduce the stock of breeding animals in the EU, thereby re-
ducing beef and veal production, which, in 2003, was already lower than the total 
consumption in the European Union for the first time in 20 years. This situation is ex-
pected to persist with intervention stocks being cleared out in 2004 (European Com-
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mission, 2004). Given this new market situation, the administered price for beef could 
become obsolete. Therefore, the European Union could simply abolish it, reducing its 
reported AMS accordingly without actually doing anything else. Compared to the es-
timated Total AMS and Total Trade Distorting Domestic Support, this exercise will 
reduce the levels by €3.6 billion. Along with abolishing the administered price for 
beef the European Union could analyze all the market organizations in the same way. 
Another strategy could be simply to abolish the administrative price and then support 
the internal European price by means of border protection8. The problem here is just 
that the European Union also finds itself under attack on this WTO issue by a long list 
of WTO member countries. If, for some reason, the politicians of the European Union 
are not satisfied with the income response of the CAP after these policy changes, Ta-
ble 7 indicates that there is room for more support in the Blue Box. 
 
In respect of the United States, two issues will de discussed. The first issue is an area 
where the United States can relatively easily cut down from the final bound AMS, 
and hence the total base commitment is the MPS payments related to its dairy policy. 
Sumner (2003) noted that the administered price for dairy could be abolished without 
hurting the American milk producers. The relationship between the administrative 
price and the actual support level for the producers are out of touch. The support ele-
ment would be more efficiently reached by a decoupled payment (Sumner, 2005 p. 
119). If this policy approach were adopted, the Total AMS and the Total Trade Dis-
torting Domestic Support reported in 2001 would be reduced by $4.5 billion. The 
second issue has something to do with the budget for American agricultural policy. 
USDA runs long-term baseline projections of budget costs. These projections are 
conducted each year in order to forecast costs of farm programs for the President’s 
budget. In their latest agricultural baseline projections to 2014 (USDA, 2005), direct 
government payments to farmers are projected to fall from over US$24 billion in 
2005 to about US$11 billion per year for the period of 2010-14. Towards the end of 
the projections, direct government payments will largely consist of fixed direct pay-
ments under the 2002 Farm Act and conservation payments, which are Green Box 
payments. This projection is based on the assumption that government payments fall 
as rising market prices for program commodities reduce loan benefits and CCP to 
farmers, and by further policy reforms implemented by lowering support ceilings cal-
culated by farm unit. If these projections are found to be the case (i.e., if marketing 
                                                 
8 The system of market organizations is fundamental for the Common Agricultural Policy and it is 
very doubtful that these possible policy changes are political feasible for the European politicians. 
The suggestion though indicates the possibilities for maneuvering in the system by abolishes admin-
istrative prices and box shifting of support. 
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loan gains and loan deficiency payments are reduced to zero and future Blue Box 
payments are drastically reduced), the AMS level notified in 2001 would be reduced 
by roughly $6.2 billion, thereby enabling the United States to comply with both the 
low and high estimated new reduction commitments9. 
5. Conclusion 
The July 2004 Framework provides a basis for developing different reduction scenar-
ios for countries with domestic support commitments. Regardless of low or high level 
of reductions, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, the European Union, and the United 
States would have problems on both Total AMS and overall base level of Total Trade 
Distorting Domestic Support.  
 
Member countries’ positions in the negotiations necessarily reflect domestic politics, 
both current and prospective. As under the Uruguay Round negotiation, the direction 
of causality is not obvious. Domestic politics influence the negotiations and the nego-
tiations influence domestic politics. A comparison of recent agricultural policy re-
forms in the European Union and the United States gives us some insights. In the 
European Union case Agenda 2000, the Midterm Review Reform and the proposed 
sugar reform are taken into account, while in the United States, its farm bills of 1996 
and 2002 are considered. Once these are taken into account, it becomes clear that both 
the European Union and the United States would be able to accommodate low and 
moderate reductions on both Total AMS and Total Trade Distorting Domestic Sup-
port. In respect of high reductions, further domestic reforms would be needed for both 
the European Union and the United States.   
 
The negative conclusion on domestic support and the Doha-Development Agenda is 
that only an agreement including high reduction commitments will mean real reduc-
tions in current domestic support levels while i.e. the European Union and the United 
States already lives up to future low or moderate reduction commitments.  
 
 
                                                 
9  The proposed cut in overall support ceilings is a very sensitive issue in the farm policy debate in 
the United States. Passing of such a bill in the Congress will face problems. According to Agra 
Europe (2005) the Secretary of Agriculture already reconsiders the proposal. USDA still have to do 
the cuts but other areas like conservation policy and Food Stamps are now mentioned as potential 
subsidy reduction areas.   
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The positive conclusion on domestic support and the DDA is that it seems like the fu-
ture agreement will be able to remove most of the water in the area of domestic sup-
port and hence the tenth multilateral round will have potentials to achieve significant 
results. 
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Figure 1. Measures of domestic support and the WTO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOMESTIC SUPPORT 
DISCIPLINED (AMBER BOX) EXEMPTED 
TAXPAYER 
FINANCED 
CONSUMER 
FINANCED 
de minimis BLUE 
BOX 
GREEN 
BOX 
DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS 
Product‐ and 
non‐product 
specific AMS, 
calculated as 5% 
above de minimis 
of the value of 
production 
evaluated at 
current domestic 
market prices. 
Trade distorting 
domestic support 
(product‐ and 
non‐product 
specific) but each 
has to be less 
than 5% of the 
value of 
production. 
Production 
limiting 
programs with 
payments based 
on no more than 
85% of the base 
level of 
production. 
Non‐or minimally 
trade distorting 
policies such as 
direct payments, 
expenditures on 
programs related 
to food aid, 
environment, 
income safety 
nets, etc.. 
Investment and 
input subsidies, 
domestic support 
to encourage 
diversification 
from illicit crops, 
etc. 
Product‐specific 
AMS, calculated 
as 5% above de 
minimis and 
evaluated at the 
difference 
between 1986‐88 
world reference 
price and 
domestic price. 
 
 
Notes: The 5 percent above de minimis applies for the sum of taxpayer- and consumer-financed support. The de minimis exemption can include consumer-financed support. 
 
Source: de Gorter and Baffes (2005) 
 
  
Table 1.  Current total AMS, 1999 (US$ million)  
 Rice Wheat Grains Veg. &
Fruits
Oil-
seeds
Sugar Fibres Wine To-
bacco
Live-
stock
Beef Pork Poultry Other
Meat
Milk NPS** Others Total
Iceland 0 0 0 0 3 0 14 15 2 29 03 0 0 85
 
  
  
el 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52 05 0 57
 
  
nd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
lia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 0 0 40
  
 
0 0 0 0  0 1 1
Norway 0 42 144 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 259 195 130 113 467 -9 0 1359
Switzerland*
 
0 163 158 75 30 0 0 0 5 0 383 458 187
 
0 651 0 0 2110
Japan 0 617 197 0 89 492 9 0 0 0 1503 2370 0 0 1270 0 143 6690
EU15 410 3048
0
4593 9933
0
2273
0
6004 794 2140
0
1027 0 13649
0
0 0 0 6064
0
0 0 49934
0Isra  
 
2 2
Canada 0 0 136 0 29 0 0 0 0 5 0 109 0 0 361 0 0 639
USA 435 974 2779 119 3400 1207 2364 0 924 0 0 0 0 0 4660 0 0 16862
New  
Zeala
Austra
Other 
Countries* 1708 80 495 67 0 128 61 0 90 0 0 0 0 0 15 67 0 2715
  
Total 2556 4927 8501 10212 5821 7831 3231 2140 2047 5 15807 3147 389 143 13836 57 143 80792
Notes: * Switzerland's reported AMS is for the year 1998, Brazil 1997/98, Jordan 2002, Mexico 1998, Thailand 1998 and Venezuela 1998. 
  ** Non Product Specific (NPS) domestic support . n.a. not available. Sources: WTO (2004b) and USDA (2004) 
 
Table 2. Payments not included in current total AMS due to de minimis, 1999 (US$ million) 
Rice Wheat Grains Veg. &
Fruits
Oil-
seeds
Sugar Fibres Wine To-
bacco
Live-
stock
Beef Pork Poultry Other
Meat
Milk NPS** Others Total
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
d* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 16 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 03 0 322
ael 0 3 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 0 0 60 7 88
 
 0 0 0 14 2 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 06 435
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
lia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 4 0 3 0 14
  
 
0 0 0 0 0
Norw
Switzerlan
 Japan 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 199 0 292
EU  3
Isr  
Canada
SA
0 42 0 11 14 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 2 115
U  0 74 0 7
New  
Zealand 
Austra
Other  
Countries* 25 7 55 62 94 89 0 0 0 28 2 9 0 0 0 480 36 892
Total 26 69 56 177 111 89 0 0 0 41 49 15 21 4 0 8451 45 9156
Notes: * Switzerland's reported AMS is for the year 1998, Brazil 1997/98, Jordan 2002, Mexico 1998, Thailand 1998 and Venezuela 1998. 
     ** Non Product Specific (NPS) domestic support . n.a. not available. Source: WTO (2004b) and USDA (2004)
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 Table 3.  EU15 AMS notifications, 2000/01 (million Euro) 
        
Market 
Price 
Support
Non-
Exempt
Direct
Payments
Other
Product 
Specific 
Support
Equivalent
Measure of
Support
Non
 Product 
Specific
AMS Commit-
ment
  
Rice 393 0 0 0 0 393
Wheat 1932 8 0 0 0 2271
Grains 3350 306 0 0 0 3672
Veg. & Fruits 0 746 0 8796 0 9537
Oilseeds 2070 0 0 103 0 2173
Sugar 5797 12 0 0 0 5809
Fibbers 0 0 0 888 0 888
Wine 0 0 0 807 0 807
Tobacco 0 964 0 0 0 964
Livestock 0 0 0 0 0 0
Beef 11190 0 0 0 0 11190
Pork 0 10 0 0 0 0
Poultry 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other meat 0 0 0 0 0 0
Milk 5951 0 0 0 0 5951
NPS 0 0 0 0 538 0
  
T
 
otal 30684 2047 0 10593 538 43654 67159
 
 
Table 4.  United States AMS notifications, 2001 (US$ million) 
        
Market 
Price 
Support
Non-
Exempt
Direct
Payments
Other
Product 
Specific 
Support
Equivalent
Measure of
Support
Non 
Product 
Specific
AMS Commit-
ment
  
Rice 0 728 35 0 0 763
Wheat 0 177 13 0 0 0
Grains 0 1219 77 0 0 1270
Veg. & Fruits 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oilseeds 311 3533 160 0 0 4004
Sugar 1032 27 2 0 0 1061
Fibres 0 2723 87 0 0 2810
Wine 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tobacco 0 6 -7 0 0 0
Livestock 0 22 0 0 0 22
Beef 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pork 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poultry 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other meat 0 0 0 0 0 0
Milk 4483 0 0 0 0 4483
NPS 0 0 0 0 6828 0
  
T
 
otal 5826 8435 367 0 6828 14413 19103
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 Table 5.  Domestic support base commitments, new commitments and latest 
WTO notifications 
  
Currency AMS De
minimis
Blue Box Totall Produc-
tion 
value
Total as
percent
of prod.
value
Reduc-
tion
Total/
AMS
    (1) (2) (3) (4)=(1+2+3) (5) (6)=(4/5) (7)
  
Iceland Base 
Commitent*
Million 
SDR 130 6 15 150 114 132
 
New 
Commitment**
 
65 2.5% 6 60 60/50
 
New 
Commitment**
 
52 2.5% 6 45 70/60
 Notif. 2000***   117 0 0 117
    
Norway Base 
Commitment
Million 
NOK 11449 884 7880 20213 17682 114
 
New 
Commitment
 
5725 2.5% 884 8085 60/50
 
New 
Commitment
 
4580 2.5% 884 6064 70/60
 Notif. 2001   10700 0 7240 17940
    
Switzer-
land- 
Base 
Commitment
Million  
Sw f. 4257 365 365 4987 7304 68
Liecht. New 
Commitment
 
2129 2.5% 365 1995 60/50
 
New 
Commitment
 
1703 2.5% 365 1496 70/60
 Notif. 1998   3273 0 0 3273
    
Japan Base
 Commitment
Billion  
Yen 3973 452 452 4878 9047 54
 
New 
Commitment
 
1987 2.50% 452 1951 60/50
 
New 
Commitment
 
1589 2.5% 452 1463 70/60
 Notif. 2000   709 32 93 833
    
EU15 Base 
Commitment
Million  
Euros 67159 12097 21521 100777 241943 42
 
New 
Commitment
 
33580 2.5% 12097 40311 60/50
 
New
 Commitment
 
26864 2.5% 12097 30233 70/60
  Notif. 2000/01   43654 561 22223 66438
  
Canada Base 
Commitment
Million 
Can$ 4301 1537 1537 7375 30737 24
 
New 
Commitment
 
2796 2.5% 1537 4056 45/35
 
New 
Commitment
 
1935 2.5% 1537 2581 65/55
 
 
Notif. 1999   
 
939 1102 0 2041
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 Table 5.  Continued 
  
USA Base 
Commitment
Million  
US$ 19103 9656 9656 38416 193129 20
 
New 
Commitment
 
12417 2.5% 9656 21129 45/35
 
New
 Commitment
 
8596 2.5% 9656 13446 65/55
 Notif. 2001   14413 7045 0 21458
    
New  
Zealand 
Base 
Commitment
Million  
NZ$ 288 669 669 1626 13385 12
 New 
Commitment
 
216 2.5% 669 1057 35/25
 New 
Commitment
 
158 2.5% 669 732 55/45
 Notif. 2001   0 0 0 0
    
Australia Base 
Commitment
Million  
A$ 472 1747 1747 3965 34934 11
 
New 
Commitment
 
354 2.5% 1747 2577 35/25
 
New 
Commitment
 
260 2.5% 1747 1784 55/45
  
 
Notif. 2002/03   
 
213 20 0 233
 
* Base level of trade-distorting domestic support  
The Total AMS (1) Base level values are taken from the Uruguay Rounds final bound AMS levels. 
The permitted De minimis (2) payments included in the overall base level of trade-distorting domestic support 
are calculated as 5 percent of the total value of agricultural production as defined by an average production 
value in a given reference period (column (5)). Blue Box (3) payments included in the Total Base Level of all 
trade distorting support is the higher of existing Blue Box payments during the 1995–2000 period or 5 percent 
of the value of agricultural production (5). The Total (4) value of overall base level of support is column (1) + 
(2) + (3) The reference value of agricultural production (5) in OECD countries is calculated as the average 
production value in the period 1999–2002 using values found in the PSE Tables. For other countries an av-
erage of the reported total value of agricultural production found in the WTO notifications has been used 
where available. In column (6) the Total value of the overall base level of all trade-distorting domestic support 
is calculated as a percentage of the value of agricultural production with Iceland having the largest percent-
age value and Australia the lowest among developed countries. In column (7) the assumed reduction com-
mitments for the overall base level of domestic support is specified, where developing countries with the 
highest level of possible trade distorting domestic support as defined in column (6) making the largest reduc-
tions. 
** New commitments 
The Total AMS and the overall base level of domestic support is reduced by a low and a high reduction 
commitment (column 10) The permitted De minimis value of domestic support is reduced from 5/10 percent 
of agricultural production value, to 2.5/5 percent. Blue Box payments are limited to 5 percent of the agricul-
tural production value found in column (5). The Total overall base level of domestic support is reduced by the 
percentage found in column (7) 
*** The latest notification to the WTO 
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 Table 6. Agenda 2000 and MTR Intervention Price reduction 
Notification 2000/01 New
Administered Price Euro/t Administered Price Euro/t
  
Cereals 110.25 101.3
Rice 298.40 150.0
Skimmed milk powder 2055.20 1747.0
Butter 3282.00 2464.0
Beef 3242.00 2224.0*
Sugar 631.90 385.5* 
 
 
Note: * The Agenda 2000 reform of the CAP and the proposed sugar reform abolishes the intervention prices 
for beef and sugar respectively, which has been, until now, used in the calculation of MPS in the EU’s notifi-
cation to the WTO. Instead the EU introduces a basic price of 2224 € per tonne of beef and a reference price 
for sugar of 385.5 € per tonne. The new basic and reference prices act as trigger level for private storage as 
well as setting the level of border protection in the EU. In the calculations made in this paper it is assumed 
that the EU will notify these prices as new administered prices and use them in the calculation of the MPS 
component of the AMS. 
Sources: EU (2003a,b,c), European Commission (2004). 
 
 
Table 7. Possible overall reduction in EU-15 trade distorting domestic support 
(million €) 
De minimis Total trade
AMS Non
Product
Specific
Product
Specific
Blue
Box
Distorting Do-
mestic
Support
  
Million EUROS 
Base Commitment 67159 12097
 
21521
 
100777
Notif. 2001 43654 538
 
40
 
22223
 
66455
     Of which MPS 30684
Reductions 
MPS reductions  
    Rice 
 
-376     
    Rye 
 
-238
    Other cereals 
 
-1701
    Milk 
 
-1893
    Beef 
 
-7533
    Sugar 
 
-3425  
Total MPS reductions 
 
-15166    
 
-15166
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 Table 7. Continued  
Non MPS reductions 
 
17
 
0
 
-17
 
-18223
 
-18223
New domestic support 
 
28505
 
538 23
 
4000
 
33066
New Commitment 
60/50 
 
33580
 
6049
 
12097
 
40311
New Commitment 
70/60 
 
26864
6049 12097 30233
 
 
Table 8. Domestic support reductions in the United States (million US$) 
De minimis  Total trade 
Million US$ AMS Non Product 
Specific
Product 
Specific
Blue 
Box 
Distorting 
Domestic 
Support 
Base Commitment 19103 9656 9656 38415 
Notif. 2001 14413 6828 217 0 21458 
     of which MPS 5826       
Reductions   
MPS reductions 0  0 
Non MPS reductions 206 -4640 -206 4640 0 
New domestic support 14619 2188 11 4640 21458 
New Commitment 45/35 12417 4828  9656 21128 
New Commitment 65/55 8596 4828  9656 13445 
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